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Case comment  
Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach1  
Case C-318/05 Commission v Germany2  
Joined Cases C-11/06 and C-12/06 Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln; Bucher v Landrat des 
Kreises Düren3 
 
 
 
 
[T]he question to be examined…lies at the meeting point between direct taxation and 
education policy. As Community law stands at present, both areas fall within the 
competence of the Member States. However….4 
 
In the autumn of 2007, the Court of Justice delivered judgment in (originally) four cases that 
challenged aspects of German law against EC free movement rights, primarily those 
grounded in services (Article 49 EC) and EU citizenship (Article 18 EC). If the history of free 
movement within Europe is traced through the story of the migrant scholar, then the origins 
of the Union could be said to lie in Classical Greece.5 Crossing State borders for education 
also illustrates the nature of most inter-State movement by EU citizens today – it is not fixed, 
permanent and driven by economic or political necessity; but more typically functional, 
temporary and by choice. Interestingly, in the present cases, all of the applicants were 
German nationals relying on Community law against their home State.  
The judgments primarily consolidate and enhance citizenship-infused case law on 
Member State financial support for education,6 and cement the Court’s powerfully liberal 
restriction-based approach to the law of the internal market. This means too, of course, that 
questions about unwarranted Community interference in sensitive State competences 
inescapably – but rightfully – follow.  
 
                                                          
1 Judgment of 11 September 2007, not yet reported. 
2 Judgment of 11 September 2007, not yet reported. 
3 Judgment of 23 October 2007, not yet reported. 
4 Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl in Schwarz and Commission v Germany, delivered on 
21 September 2006, para. 2. 
5 See Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s historical overview in his Opinion in Morgan 
and Bucher, delivered on 20 March 2007, para. 37 et seq. 
6 See especially, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-
Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193 and Case C-209/03 Bidar v London Borough of Ealing; Secretary of State 
for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119; and against a home State, Case C-224/98 D’Hoop v 
Office national de l’emploi [2002] ECR I-6191. 
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The Cases: Factual Background 
 
All of the proceedings related to different means of support available under German law for 
persons participating in education either directly (financial grants for students undertaking 
third-level courses in Morgan and Bucher) or indirectly (tax relief for parents paying private 
school fees in Schwarz and Commission v Germany); but the relevant legal provisions either 
restricted or prohibited these benefits for anyone claiming them in relation to educational 
institutions established abroad.  
 Turning first to Morgan and Bucher, German Federal Law7 made the award of 
education or training grants to students who wished to attend education or training 
establishments abroad conditional on a number of criteria, including (1) a continuation 
proviso8 i.e. completion first of at least one year in Germany of the same studies that would 
then be pursued abroad and (2) a permanent residence criterion,9 applied to German students 
who lived close to the borders of, and travelled back and forth for the purposes education to, 
other States. Without having undertaken related studies in Germany, Ms Morgan 
commenced the first year of a course in applied genetics at the University of the West of 
England in Bristol in September 2004. Her application for an education or training grant was 
rejected on the grounds that she did not fulfil the continuation criterion. In addition to having 
the same ‘continuation’ problem, Ms Bucher’s grant application was also rejected on the basis 
that she had moved from Bonn to Düren (close to the Netherlands) only in July 2003, prior to 
commencing her studies in ergotherapy in Heerlen in September of the same year. In both 
cases, joined for the purposes of an Article 234 EC reference by the Administrative Court in 
Aachen, the applicants argued that since courses in neither applied genetics nor ergotherapy 
were available in Germany, they were losing out financially simply because they wished to 
follow their chosen fields of study. They therefore submitted that the restrictions imposed on 
them by the German legislation contravened the free movement rights guaranteed by Article 
18 EC. 
 Under German income tax law,10 the possibility of offsetting against taxable income 
the fees (and some other specified expenses) paid for private schooling was precluded in 
respect of fees paid to educational institutions established outwith Germany. This limitation 
was challenged in Schwarz by parents who opted to send their children to a private school in 
                                                          
7 Federal Law on the encouragement of education and training (BAföG). 
8 § 5(2) of the BAföG. 
9 § 5(1) of the BAföG. 
10 Conferred through § 10(1)(9) of the Law on Income Tax (EStG) 
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Scotland,11 and under Article 226 EC infringement proceedings in Commission v Germany. In 
both actions, the arguments sought to demonstrate that by conferring an advantage only in 
respect of schools established in Germany, the income tax law was discriminatory and thus 
infringed Articles 39 (workers), 43 (establishment), 49 (services) and 18 (citizenship) of the EC 
Treaty.12 As a preliminary yet fundamental point, the German Government argued against 
the application of Article 49 EC at all, contesting the character of education as a service 
‘normally provided for remuneration’ in accordance with Article 50 EC.13  
 
The Judgments 
 
Primarily, the three Court of Justice decisions pull together strands of legal principle already 
established in the case law; but they also build further on the Community legal canon. The 
Court and the Advocates-General were distinctly in agreement in their elaboration of the core 
principles outlined in the following paragraphs – essentially, the existence of restrictions on 
free movement in all three cases and the inadequacy of the State arguments submitted as 
justifications. The Opinions, as would be expected, review in more depth the evolution of 
these legal principles over time, tracing their origins and development in the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Beyond this, however, the Opinions particularly contribute significant insights 
about the contextual tensions within which the principles are embedded; these observations 
are picked up throughout this note where relevant. 
The Court first confirmed that the pursuit of studies in other Member States 
generates a sufficient cross-border element so that nationals may rely on the principles of 
equal treatment protected by Community law against their own States.14 Recalling the dictum 
cited at the beginning of this comment, it was also made clear that while competence for the 
content and organisation of education systems and for matters relating to direct taxation lie 
                                                          
11 Cademuir International School, a specialist school for children demonstrating exceptional 
potential. 
12 The relevance of Articles 39 and 43 EC was ruled out in Schwarz since the applicants were 
neither migrant workers nor established in another State; in Commission v Germany, the 
judgment concentrated primarily on services and citizenship (as discussed below) but 
analogous effects relating to workers and establishment were acknowledged (see paras. 112-
123 of the judgment). 
13 Relying on Case 263/86 Belgium v Humbel and Edel [1988] ECR 5365 and Case C-109/92 Wirth 
v Landeshauptstadt Hannover [1993] ECR I-6447; the Commission cited the same judgments to 
make the opposite argument i.e. as authority that privately-funded education fell within the 
scope of Community law on services (cf. paras. 52 and 41 of the judgment in Commission v 
Germany). 
14 Morgan and Bucher, paras. 22-23; see also Schwarz, para. 88, Commission v Germany, para. 127. 
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with the Member States, ‘it is none the less the case that [these competences] must be 
exercised in compliance with Community law’.15 
 A comprehensive hindrance/deterrence approach to restrictions (both actual and 
possible) on freedom of movement comes through very strongly in all of the judgments. This 
enables a broad reading of the Treaty freedoms, especially for present purposes of both 
Article 18 and Article 49 EC. As an interpretative formula, the hindrance/deterrence method 
confirms that the fundamental objectives which underpin free movement are, first, the 
avoidance of any obstacle or disadvantage that has been or might be suffered by a 
Community national who engages in cross-border activity (hindrance) as well as, second, 
ensuring that he or she is in no way deterred or discouraged from availing of the free 
movement opportunities created by the EC Treaty or penalised purely for having exercised 
those opportunities (deterrence).16  
In Schwarz and Commission v Germany, the Court reaffirmed the interpretative 
principle that provisions like Article 49 EC constitute specific expressions of the rights 
guaranteed by Article 18 EC, and so recourse to the protection offered by EU citizenship 
should remain a secondary exercise. This means that the substantive rights unique to 
citizenship should be considered only when the situation at hand can not be resolved by the 
application of the classic four freedoms.17 The breadth of the hindrance/deterrence formula 
applies across the board, however, so that Article 49 similarly proscribes ‘the application of 
any national rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between Member 
States more difficult than the provision of services purely within a Member State’.18 In 
keeping with the intention of drawing the parameters of free movement restrictions as widely 
and loosely as possible, the ‘more difficult’ test could not really be said to represent an 
unduly high threshold. 
                                                          
15 Morgan and Bucher, para. 24 (education); Schwarz, paras. 69 (tax) and 70 (education), 
similarly Commission v Germany, paras. 85 and 86. In Morgan and Bucher, Advocate-General 
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer sought to distinguish the legal approach relevant to study grants from 
the case law on direct taxation, since the latter field is more problematic for persons who 
transfer their residence (see paras. 76-78 of the Opinion). Avoiding the problematic 
implications of taxation seems to be a current challenge for the Court more broadly, thinking 
also of recent judgments like Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer plc v Halsley (Her Majesty 
Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837, where resolution of the case using freedom of 
establishment enabled the Court to avoid the more complicated influence of Article 58 EC. 
16 See Morgan and Bucher, para. 25-26; Schwarz, para. 89, Commission v Germany, para. 128. 
17 Schwarz, paras. 34-35, Commission v Germany, paras. 32-37. 
18 Schwarz, para. 61, Commission v Germany, para. 81, arguably a less complicated version of 
the Keck test developed for Article 28 EC (Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal 
proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097, paras. 16 and 17). 
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The combined effect of this methodology was that all the contested provisions of 
German law were found to contravene Article 18 EC (in all three judgments) and Article 49 
EC (in Schwarz and Commission v Germany). In Morgan and Bucher, the ‘personal 
inconvenience, additional costs and possible delays’ associated with compelling students to 
commence their university studies in Germany for at least one year were found liable to 
restrict the movement of EU citizens who wished to study abroad.19 The Court was not 
persuaded by the German Government’s attempts to justify the continuation of studies 
proviso and therefore rejected arguments based on, first, trying to establish and ensure the 
student’s commitment and adherence to their chosen field of studies; second, an excessive 
financial burden that supporting studies abroad might cause, thus leading to a reduction in 
the overall level of grants awarded; and, third, avoiding unfair duplication of benefits that 
might be awarded by host States. As might be expected, particular scepticism was directed at 
the necessity of a continuation requirement per se to meet any of these needs, reflecting once 
again the profound importance of a proportionality analysis.  
In light of the Court’s answer on this aspect of the reference, the national court had 
indicated that Ms Bucher’s application would be upheld and so it was not necessary to 
examine the permanent residence condition.20 
In Schwarz and Commission v Germany, the Court agreed with the Commission rather 
than with the German Government on the interpretation of Humbel and Wirth, finding that 
‘courses given by educational establishments essentially financed by private funds’ did 
constitute services within the meaning of Article 50 EC.21 The differential tax rules under 
review were then found to infringe the free movement of services since they had the effect of 
‘deterring taxpayers resident in Germany from sending their children to schools established 
in another Member State’.22 Again, attempts were made by the German Government to justify 
                                                          
19 Morgan and Bucher, para. 30. 
20 This seems a little odd, as the issues raised with regard to defining permanent residence for 
border students are quite different from the continuation question. Advocate-General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer did briefly address the second question; even though the primary 
‘movement’ in Ms Bucher’s case was within Germany, he suggested that the permanent 
residence criterion also infringed Article 18 EC and that if limitations on the award of grants 
needed to be imposed, other conditions (e.g. standards of academic performance) would be 
fairer and more compatible with equal treatment requirements (see paras. 121-122 of the 
Opinion). 
21 Schwarz, paras. 39-40; see also Commission v Germany, paras. 67-72. The implications of this 
finding and its interrelationship with citizenship rights are discussed further below. 
22 Schwarz, para. 66. In Schwarz, this finding was confined to the factual scope of the case itself 
i.e. the rights of the applicants as service recipients (although, to describe the receipt of 
services, the Commission uses the needlessly complicating language of ‘passive provision’). 
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its income tax legislation. Its reasoning was anchored in the burdens placed on public 
finances in general, but also in particular financial and administrative arrangements which 
meant that the State subsidised, regulated and controlled many aspects of the governance 
private schools in Germany (as compared to the often wholly different character of private 
schools in other States). These arguments failed to convince the Court. Again, a clear 
emphasis on proportionality was used to decouple the public interest arguments submitted 
from the effectiveness of a tax-relief differential actually to achieve those aims. Should the 
national court find subsequently that Article 49 did not apply in this case (for example, if it 
were to find that the Scottish school in question was not ‘essentially financed by private 
funds’23), the Court of Justice confirmed in the alternative that its hindrance/deterrence 
analysis applied similarly in respect of Article 18 EC and so the differential tax rule would 
disadvantage EU citizens resident in Germany whose children were educated in private 
schools established in other States.24  
 
Comment 
 
Whether in the context of an internal market in balder trade terms or a more constitutionally 
complex and ambitious polity that can properly lay claim to the language and rights of 
citizenship, it is hard to find fault in principle with the realisation the themes outlined above. 
But when reading these three recent judgments, I could not shake off a sense of something 
approaching unease, coalescing around, first, the interpretation of restrictions and related 
market/citizenship tensions; and, second, the erosion of the State justification rationale. It is 
fair to state at the outset that the three judgments annotated here do not, in themselves, raise 
particularly grave concerns. It is difficult to sympathise with continuation conditions or tax 
relief divergences that constrain the cross-border choices made by students or their parents so 
blatantly. Moreover, the particular nature of those conditions could not be objectively linked 
to public interest arguments underpinning education and taxation policy more broadly. It is 
rather that the interpretative structure employed by the Court in all of the cases illustrates 
                                                                                                                                                                      
The restrictive impact on schools established in other States as (‘active’) providers of services 
was addressed in Commission v Germany, however (see para. 80).  
23 The Advocate-General suggested that this might apply also to parents who had moved for 
‘purely private reasons…relying on their general right to free movement’ (para. 90 of the 
Opinion); even in such circumstances, however, payment for cross-border school fees would 
still surely bring the matter within the scope of services. 
24 Schwarz, paras. 86-92; Commission v Germany, paras. 127-132. In both cases, the Court went 
on to dismiss in subsequent paragraphs the same justification arguments that had been 
rejected in respect of Article 49 EC. 
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plainly how Community law can impinge on the most profound examples of sovereign State 
choices. And when they do, the question that remains is how best to balance competing 
State/free movement interests. 
This section will address in more depth both of the themes outlined above, as they 
cut across all three of the judgments: first, the Court’s evolving conception of free movement 
law; and second, the complex nature of economically motivated restrictions on free 
movement. 
 
Citizenship, services and free movement law 
The legal content of these decisions is unlikely to startle anyone familiar with Community 
jurisprudence on freedom of movement. The judgments reflect two basic theses firmly 
established in the case law. First, an expansive commitment to effecting free movement rights 
is plain to see since the early days of Dassonville25 and van Binsbergen26. We do not even need 
to reopen the difficult discrimination/market access debate as an aid to conceptualising the 
factual situations involved in the three cases or the Court’s response to them, since the 
legislative provisions under review were all distinctly applicable i.e. all of the provisions 
sought very expressly to apply different rules in respect of education services provided in 
other States. The permanent residence requirement challenged in Morgan and Bucher was 
perhaps a bit more interesting from the perspective of legal analysis, raising the challenge of 
resolving reverse discrimination.27 But even here using a straightforward 
hindrance/deterrence interpretation, reinforced by the Singh/Akrich principle that behaving or 
acting so as intentionally to exploit Community rights is entirely acceptable,28 that 
requirement too would surely have to fall.  
Second, the contribution of Article 18 EC to free movement is by now unassailable.  
As the body of case law on EU citizenship continues to grow, it is clear that national courts 
                                                          
25 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
26 Case 33/74 van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] 
ECR 1299. 
27 Advocate-General Sharpston addressed some of these issues recently in Case C-212/06 
Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Community, case 
pending; Opinion delivered on 28 June 2007 (see paras. 112 onwards, noting at para. 133 the 
suggestion that EU citizenship perhaps provides an ‘additional impetus’ for confronting the 
purely internal conundrum.   
28 See Case C-370/90 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [1992] ECR I-4265, para. 24 and Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607, paras. 56 and 57. As to when that line might actually 
be crossed, Advocate-General Geelhoed in Akrich traces the existence of a doctrine of abuse of 
Community law across various market freedoms (see paras. 169-185 of his Opinion). 
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(and lawyers) know its potential. As the Court continues incrementally to fashion 
increasingly de-economised rights to movement and residence, the Member States know it 
too.29 The judgment in Martínez Sala might have surprised those States who saw (and/or 
intended) nothing but words in the EC Treaty citizenship provisions.30 But the intensifying 
independence of citizenship rights in a substantive sense is the most striking and consistent 
feature of case law on the free movement of persons in the decade since then. In Morgan and 
Bucher, Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer traced the severance of Article 18 EC from 
even Article 12 EC, making the ‘original’ judgment in Martínez Sala seem almost backward 
already.31 Furthermore, the functional step taken in that case to locate child-raising 
allowances within the material scope of Community law has also been progressively 
consigned to legal history.32 Both of these legal advances considerably reduce the need for 
more rigorous comparative assessment of the applicant’s situation vis-à-vis purely internal 
situations. In Schwarz, for example, the Court rejected an approach that would have made it 
necessary to compare the nature of private schools in Germany and the UK.33 
 Before looking in more depth at the justification side of the equation (below), the 
character of free movement and of restrictions on free movement need to be located in a 
broader debate that looks beyond just results in individual cases. For example, what does the 
realisation of an internal market demand from law, and what do rights grounded in 
citizenship add to that? The 1985 White Paper34 is perhaps the only serious and holistic 
reflection on the first part of that question that a Community institution has ever produced. 
Though the language and tenor were workmanlike, the Paper nonetheless mapped the most 
ambitious legal adventure attempted since the drafting of the Treaty itself. The 2007 Single 
Market Review35 is an altogether different exercise. The use of a legislative programme is 
expressly excluded, reflecting the evolution of the market over time and the wider range of 
regulatory methods (of which legislation is just one) that the Commission now feels is suited 
                                                          
29 The dwindling relevance of economic self-sufficiency is well illustrated by Case C-456/02 
Trojani v Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles (CPAS) [2004] ECR I-7573. 
30 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691. 
31 Morgan and Bucher, Opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, para. 43. 
32 See, for example, the Opinion of Advocate-General Kokott in Tas-Hagen and Tas, where she 
remarks that ‘Union citizens can assert their right to free movement even if the matter 
concerned or the benefit claimed is not governed by Community law’ (para. 33 of her 
Opinion in Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas v Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en 
Uitkeringsraad [2006] ECR I-10451, citing Case C-148/02 García Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR 
I-11613, para. 25 in support). 
33 See Schwarz, paras. 44-47. 
34 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310. 
35 European Commission, A single market for 21st century Europe, COM(2007) 724 final. 
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‘to foster[ing] flexibility and adaptability while maintaining the legal and regulatory certainty 
necessary to preserve a well-functioning single market’.36 This is rather different from the 
Court’s vision of things. All three of the 2007 judgments exemplify the Court’s longstanding 
and powerful free movement ideology, which assumes as a default position that the rules 
challenged are most likely to constitute restrictions. When this philosophy of the nature of 
restrictions is applied in conjunction with the ‘however’ formula outlined earlier then really, 
no aspect of Member State competence is immune from Community scrutiny in theory, so 
long as each individual challenge is hooked on a factual situation attracting the necessary 
cross-border link. This is an extremely forceful tactic. In Schwarz, Advocate-General Stix-
Hackl observed in this context that ‘[t]here will therefore be doubts as to the extent to which a 
balance can be achieved between the exercise of national competences and the requirements 
of the internal market.’37 Taking a straight view of the analysis applied by the Court, and 
remembering the limiting factual circumstances that these cases expose, that the balance 
achieved falls on the side of the requirements of the internal market and its free movement 
rationale seems fair and logical: ‘Germany, like all of the other Member States, is not obliged 
by Community law to award grants for education or training abroad, since it has a wide 
discretion to award them and to settle any relevant conditions of the award. However, if it 
does so, it must respect Union law.’38  
But there are two potential problems with that approach that merit further thinking. 
First, especially in relation to the permanent residence condition in Morgan and Bucher, it is 
arguable that the effect of the judgments is sited closer to inducing or even rewarding cross-
border movement than merely facilitating it (anti-hindrance) or not discouraging it (anti-
deterrence). Second, the ‘particular respect’ the Advocate-General nonetheless felt should be 
accorded to direct taxation and education policy does not seem deeply in evidence in the 
outcome of any of the cases. In support of its internal market preference, it is not really 
surprising to find that the Court in Schwarz and Commission v Germany made numerous 
references to comparable developments relating to health services.39 The case law on access to 
cross-border healthcare cuts similarly into sensitive Member State policy fields, complicated 
                                                          
36 Ibid., p. 4. 
37 Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl in Schwarz and Commission v Germany, para. 4. She 
later referred in support to the Opinion of Advocate-General Maduro in Case C-446/03 Marks 
& Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-10837, see especially 
paras. 21-24 of the Opinion. 
38 Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Morgan and Bucher, para. 123 of the Opinion 
(author’s translation from French). 
39 See, for example, Schwarz, paras. 45-46; Commission v Germany, paras. 73-76. 
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by the parallel intrinsic relationship of the subject-matter with taxation and questions of social 
solidarity.40 The application of Article 50 EC to questions about remuneration for healthcare, 
and the source of that remuneration (often from public funds), has stretched the parameters 
of the Treaty provisions on services to the limit. But the recent trilogy of judgments on 
education possibly takes things even further. A right of access to medical treatment in other 
Member States is made dependent on a range of criteria that first assesses the availability of 
the same or equally effective treatment in the home State.41 This suggests a willingness to 
delve into comparative assessments in a substantive way. In Schwarz, the Court did not 
discuss or rely in any way on whether ‘equally effective’ private schools for gifted children 
were or were not available in Germany, nor was anything made of the fact that Ms Morgan 
and Ms Bucher could not have studied their chosen courses in Germany.  
On the face of it, at least, the three recent judgments did preserve publicly-funded 
education from the impact of EC services law.42 But the final paragraphs in both Schwarz and 
Commission v Germany push the alternate door of citizenship ajar. While the factual 
circumstances here involved tax relief in respect of private education, surely the principle 
developed under Article 18 EC relates more broadly to (any?) schools that do not provide 
services in accordance with Article 50 EC. The judgment in Morgan and Bucher, a ‘pure’ 
exercise in citizenship rights, supports the notion that the public/private education distinction 
is irrelevant in the context of home State financial support for education pursued by EU 
citizens abroad. So one wonders whether continued cross-fertilisation with the healthcare 
case law might lead ultimately to a more citizen- or choice- than treatment-oriented test in 
that sphere too. All of this resonates strongly with the market rights/human rights debate 
illustrated so well by the decision in Carpenter and by the robust (and, to be fair, divided) 
academic response, not least the deeply critical Editorial Comments in this journal.43 The 
author of that comment objected forcefully to the Court’s ‘overstretching the scope of the 
                                                          
40 There is a wealth of academic comment on the healthcare case law and on questions of 
transnational solidarity more generally, exemplified by the essays in M. Dougan and E. 
Spaventa (eds.) Social Welfare and EU Law (London, Hart, 2005); more recently see for 
example, G. Davies, ‘The Community's internal market-based competence to regulate 
healthcare: Scope, strategies and consequences’, (2007) 14 MJ 215-238 and A. Somek, 
‘Solidarity decomposed: Being and time in European citizenship’, (2007) 32 ELRev 787-818. 
41 See for example, Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford 
Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325, paras. 61-67.  
42 An understanding of the limits to the law on services that is expressly incorporated in 
Recital 34 of the Preamble to Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, 2006 OJ 
L376/36. 
43 Case C-60/00 Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279; and see 
‘Freedoms unlimited?’, (2003) 40 CMLRev 537-543. 
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freedoms in order to reach an admittedly just solution in the individual case’.44 The express 
use of Article 18 EC in Schwarz and Commission v Germany in order to deliver what Article 49 
EC could not shows that an interpretative shift has been made since Carpenter. In Morgan and 
Bucher, the Advocate-General attached strong significance to the distinctiveness of the 
market-citizenship legal compound, suggesting that citizenship represents ‘a considerable 
qualitative step forward in that it separates that freedom [of movement] from its functional or 
instrumental elements (the link with an economic activity or attainment of the internal 
market) and raises it to the level of a genuinely independent right inherent in the political 
status of the citizens of the Union.’45 The application of citizenship can still be accommodated 
in functional or instrumental internal market and movement concepts, however; citizens are 
‘persons’ after all. But it does not entail that the scope of services (or other freedoms) needs to 
be strained improperly. The liberal legal result is the same, but perhaps the mode of getting 
there is more palatable?  
 
Economically grounded restrictions on free movement rights 
Looking at the other side of the restriction question, whether the Member States (or their 
finances) are prepared for the consequences of services-beyond-citizenship is another matter. 
Even if we can accept an internal market (free movement) framework armoured by 
citizenship rights, a latent problem may be simmering in the Court’s often light-touch review 
of justification arguments. It is a long established principle of Community law that the 
generous interpretation applied to restrictions on free movement rights is inversely 
comparable to the strict interpretation of justifications and proportionality assessments. This 
technique results in a scalping of Member State discretion, which can in turn be defended 
through a variety of rationales – the nature of rights, the crusade against protectionism, the 
gelling of the new legal order, to name but a few. Thus, notwithstanding some of the 
problems identified above, we can probably be persuaded to live with a preference for the 
widest interpretation possible of ‘restrictions’ on free movement; but whether restrictions are 
actually undue or improper deserves a closer look. 
Recent empirical work completed by Catherine Barnard demonstrates evidentially 
that over the past two decades (at least), there is a clear trend showing that an increasing 
number of ‘types’ of justification argument are raised by the Member States (and that these, in 
                                                          
44 Ibid. p. 541. 
45 Opinion of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Morgan and Bucher, para. 82. 
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turn, are listened to by the Court).46 But the success rate for States i.e. having those arguments 
override actual or potential obstacles to free movement, has in fact has fallen, even more so in 
combination with toughening proportionality assessments. These trends may illustrate a 
finding where evidence and instinct converge, where we might agree that we ‘felt’ this to be 
the case. But the critical feature of Barnard’s work for present purposes is the application of 
evidence-based methods to test and ultimately confirm that instinctive hypothesis.  
Where do evidence-based methods fit in the assessment of restrictions and 
justifications? We know that the ‘actual or potential, direct or indirect’ test established for free 
movement restrictions in Dassonville was developed initially for the purposes of competition 
law.47 In the competition law sphere, however, that test was attached to other criteria 
grounded firmly in empirical economic analysis, such as the de minimis threshold.48 But when 
it was transposed to free movement via Dassonville, the qualitative restriction analysis was 
divorced from the counterpart requirements of quantitative scrutiny. Even in questions of 
competition policy, however, there are concerns that economic analysis has become sidelined, 
and it has been suggested that ‘juridification involves the increased subjection of economic 
activities to European law.’49  
In some aspects of free movement law, there is an acknowledged space for objectively 
assessed corroboration. In respect of food law, for example, primary responsibility for the 
analysis of risk assessment and the veracity of scientific claims has been assigned to the 
European Food Safety Authority.50 Similarly, in its development of EC consumer protection 
jurisprudence, the Court eventually reached a stage where it felt that its (centralised) 
guidance on the characteristics of the ‘European’ consumer was sufficiently well-established. 
It then redistributed more (localised) responsibility to national courts for the purpose of 
assessing specificities of consumer behaviour in a given State, backed up where necessary by 
empirical studies that the national court deemed necessary to assist it in reaching judgment.51 
                                                          
46 C. Barnard, ‘Justifications, Proportionality and the Four Freedoms: Do they Really Protect 
State Interest?’, in C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds) The Outer Limits of EU Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, forthcoming); the empirical dimension of this work involved analysis of the entire 
case law output of the Court in three selected years (a decade apart from one another). 
47 See Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, p. 249. 
48 See Case 5/69 Völk v Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295. 
49 S. Wilks, ‘Agency escape: Decentralization or dominance of the European Commission in 
the modernization of competition policy?’, (2005) 18 Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration and Institutions, 431-452 at 452. 
50 I am grateful to Alastair Sutton for this point. 
51 Cf. the classic judgments that illustrate the centralised/localised approaches, Case C-315/92 
Verband Sozialer Wettbewerb v Clinique Laboratoires and Estée Lauder [1994] ECR I-397 and Case 
C-220/98 Estée Lauder v Lancaster [2000] ECR I-117. 
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By contrast, in the overwhelming majority of free movement judgments the Court is working 
on a legal instinct, on a pragmatic sense of logic, maybe even on something as amorphous as 
a gut-feeling. It seems predisposed to assuming that restrictions are improper restrictions, not 
so much because the evidence presented to it objectively proves this to be the case but, 
conversely, because the argumentation of the Member States failed properly to use evidence 
to support or prove their claims. In that context, it should be emphasised that therein the 
problem may even lie, as State submissions are often presented without any supporting data 
or projections at all. This is demonstrated very plainly in Commission v Austria, for example; 
when rejecting justification arguments which suggested that revision of university entrance 
requirements to satisfy EC non-discrimination requirements would ‘pose a risk to the 
financial equilibrium of the Austrian higher education system and, consequently, to its very 
existence’),52 the Court answered very sparsely that ‘no estimates relating to other courses 
have been submitted to the Court and that the Republic of Austria has conceded that it does 
not have any figures in that connection.’53 That is not the Court’s fault. It made the judgment 
it made on the basis of the (absence of) evidence before it, which failed to substantiate the 
Austrian Governments deeply serious claims. 
The Member States are playing dangerously in failing to pick up this very clear 
message from the Court. If they had been listening, then surely the arguments in the 2007 
cases would have been approached, even proven, quite differently. While a basic principle 
long underpinning the interpretation of free movement restrictions is that arguments based 
on economic grounds are not acceptable justifications, it would be misleading to describe this 
as an enduring or hard and fast rule. It is clear that the Court always has seen (and continues 
to see) economic protectionism as the antithesis of the internal market rationale. But it is also 
clear that as the subject matter of internal market law evolved, Member State concerns could 
not be written off purely because the associated arguments were economically rooted. What 
we are left with is not altogether coherent. There are three key points here. First, it is still fair 
to say that economically centred arguments tend not succeed. Second, this still casts the Court 
as an advocate against economic protectionism, with ‘aims of a purely economic nature’ 
usually getting short shrift.54  But third, the reasons behind these outcomes can sometimes be 
                                                          
52 Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, para. 64. 
53 Ibid., para. 65. 
54 See, for example, Case C-120/95 Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives [1998] ECR I-
1831 (para. 31; free movement of goods); Case C-35/98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v BGM 
Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071 (para. 48, free movement of capital); Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré 
and van Riet [2003] ECR I-4509 (para. 72, free movement of services). And beyond the 
freedoms, see Case C-203/96 Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV and Others v Minister van 
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a bit more complex than ‘no economic justifications please’. The Court does listen to the 
arguments sometimes, since the judgments sometimes proceed to refute them rather than 
simply dismiss them. And this is where the States’ light-touch engagement with serious 
questions about budgetary priorities and balance lets them down. If the Court’s dismissal of 
the justification seems light-touch in turn, it should not seem surprising but be seen instead 
within a structure of cause and effect. It is also striking that relatively few cases are referred 
back to the national court in these circumstances. In Morgan and Bucher, in response to 
arguments made by the Dutch and Finnish Governments that decisions about the lawfulness 
of the objectives behind German legislation could best be decided back in Aachen, the 
Advocate-General made a counter-plea for the cases to be resolved in Luxembourg. He 
rationalised this on the grounds of avoiding an otherwise likely stream of references on 
similar matters in the future.55 Is this a sufficiently persuasive reason to sanction delving into 
the details of the references? The phraseology usually adopted at these points in opinions and 
judgments is that the ‘information’ before the Court is ‘sufficient’ to enable it to give 
judgment in a substantive sense rather than to recall the services of referring courts. But 
‘information’ is no substitute for evidence.  
As noted earlier, it is not that the three education judgments present particularly 
acute problems in isolation. Rather, that stacking them on top of their predecessors in the 
fields of education, citizenship and healthcare endorses a value-judgment approach to the 
dismissal of justification arguments even in cases where public interest claims could be 
empirically tested. In her Opinion on Schwarz and Commission v Germany, Advocate-General 
Stix-Hackl stated very plainly that ‘shortfalls in tax revenue are [not] to be taken into 
consideration as matters of overriding general interest’.56 Well, says who, and why? This is not 
just a question about States preferring to maintain an ideal or even optimum financial 
balance. It cuts right to the heart of competence to set and carry through national budgetary 
priorities, prescribed in accordance with nationally rationalised choices. And national choices 
are grounded in all kinds of reasons. A rare example of hands-off decision-making seems to 
arise when the Court must tread the murky waters of morals. This is seen implicitly in its 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] ECR I-4075 (para. 44, protection of 
the environment); Case C-361/98 Italy v Commission (para. 48, transport). 
55 See paras. 111-113, including footnote 70 where he uses the gambling case law to illustrate 
his point. 
56 Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl in Schwarz and Commission v Germany, para. 60; 
citing in support, Case C-436/00 X and Y [2002] ECR I-10829, para. 50; Case C-136/00 Danner 
[2002] ECR I- 8147, para. 56; and Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071, para. 59 
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ultimately cautious judgment in Grogan,57 but more expressly in Omega,58 the ‘playing at 
killing’ case in which the Court’s reasoning displayed an unusual degree of deference to the 
German Constitution’s expression of the right to human dignity (found in turn to override 
and justify restrictions on the competing rights of service providers). Some may argue, 
however, that the recent judgment in Laval marks a return to form (this isolating the Omega 
strand of case law), with economic concerns outweighing economic (national) rights.59 
The Omega case also shows that not every justification argument can furnish 
empirical back-up, of course; but arguments rooted in public finances, which covers the 
majority of those put forward in the present cases, certainly should. It is especially 
problematic that the Court does not act consistently in its rejection/acceptance of State 
arguments rooted in economic considerations. Taking the general framework outlined above 
but looking at it more specifically through the lens of persons, Article 27(1) of Directive 
2004/38 confirms that while public policy, public security and public health arguments can be 
invoked to restrict the movement and residence rights of EU citizens, ‘[t]hese grounds shall 
not be invoked to serve economic ends’.60 This provision contains the essence of a 
presumption against economically-grounded justifications which has rippled outwards from 
the derogations listed in the Treaty itself to the open-ended category of public interest 
concerns which the Court will also consider in most cases. Again, this is the basic rule. But as 
we also saw, economic arguments have nonetheless crept into the case law on access to cross-
border healthcare and education; while they have not been argued successfully, they have 
been accepted in principle.61 Denying that this has happened only adds to a sense of 
frustration. Is it any wonder that the States who intervened in support of Germany in Morgan 
and Bucher included Austria and the UK, recently stung by judgments on university 
                                                          
57 Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685. 
58 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609, see especially para. 31 et seq. 
59 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Eyggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, judgment of 18 
December 2007, not yet reported. 
60 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004 L229/35. 
61 For example, in healthcare, see Case C-158/96 Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] I-
ECR 1931, para. 41; in education, Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969. In the 
latter case, Advocate-General Jacobs did look more deeply at the substance of the arguments 
than the Court, but he stressed that economic arguments are very much the exception to the 
rules on justifications and urged that the healthcare case law be confined as a ‘departure from 
the orthodox’ (para. 31 onwards of the Opinion). 
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admissions and student financial support respectively?62 It would be more beneficial if the 
Court were to define the strict limits of economic justifications and to make it clear to the 
Member States that any economic arguments submitted should be accompanied by relevant 
empirical evidence. 
As a final point, it must be stressed that these observations in no way call for a return 
to rampant protectionism. They seek instead to provoke a real debate on the extent of 
freedom actually needed for the proper ‘establishment and functioning of the internal 
market’ and, related to this, on the limitations to free movement that are truly necessary from 
the perspective of States. This would necessitate an acceptance in turn of the maturity of the 
Union as a no-longer-new legal order, and a trust that the whole project will not actually 
implode if a more objective approach to justification was embraced. Confronting the 
complexities of justification arguments, and of the translation of economic and other 
empirical evidence into legal reasoning and legal outcomes, presents real challenges. But not 
all national rules are inherently damaging, not even where a consequential restriction on 
cross-border activity is experienced. Exploring this proposition would not mean that all 
Member State arguments should win the day; far from it. But it would, at least, enhance the 
legal and economic sophistication of trying to win the day. 
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